Nearly a century before the Vietnam War, the United States undertook one of its first military interventions in East Asia. It was not a full-scale campaign, and it lasted only a single day. Its opponent was not a modern army but the indigenous Paiwan people of southern Taiwan. Yet the expedition exposed a problem that would become familiar in later conflicts: the limits of military power against an elusive enemy fighting on its own terrain. Known as the Formosa Expedition of 1867, this little-remembered operation ended in an embarrassing defeat for the United States Navy.
United States Marines and sailors attacking the Paiwan natives of southern Taiwan. Credit: Wikimedia Commons
The origins of the expedition lay in the wreck of the American merchant ship Rover. On March 12, 1867, the vessel was sailing off Cape Eluanbi, the southernmost point of Taiwan, then widely known in the West as Formosa, when she wrecked on an uncharted reef. The crew and passengers amounting to some two dozen people abandoned the ship and swam ashore. But instead of finding safety, they were attacked by the indigenous Paiwan people. All were killed, leaving only a single Chinese sailor alive to tell the story.
The incident outraged American officials. They contacted Qing authorities and demanded action. Qing officials admitted that they exercised little authority over the Paiwan territories where the killings had occurred. Although Taiwan was officially part of the Qing Empire, their authority was strongest in the island's western plains and coastal settlements. Large portions of the mountainous interior and southern regions remained under the control of indigenous communities that governed themselves.
The Qing government essentially told American authorities to deal with the situation themselves and they promised not to interfere.
After a delay of three months, it was decided that a punitive expedition would take place. And thus in early June, Rear Admiral Henry H. Bell left Shanghai with two warships, the USS Hartford and USS Wyoming, for southern Taiwan carrying approximately 180 sailors and Marines.
On June 13, 1867, the landing force came ashore near Taiwan's southern tip and began advancing inland. The mission was to march into Paiwan territory, locate the village believed responsible for the attack, destroy it, and punish the warriors involved in the massacre.
Map of Taiwan during the Qing dynasty. Credit: Wikimedia Commons
Southern Taiwan in 1867 was heavily forested, with dense undergrowth, bamboo thickets, ravines, rocky ridges, and steep hillsides. The Americans did not know the terrain well, and possessed only vague information about the location of Paiwan settlements. Besides, the heat was oppressive which was exacerbated by the heavy uniforms that the Americans were wearing.
The Paiwan took advantage of this terrain. They hid behind foliage and fired from concealed positions before disappearing into the vegetation. Whenever American troops attempted to charge, their attackers melted away, only to reappear elsewhere and strike again.
The Paiwan knew the landscape intimately. They understood which ridges provided observation points, which ravines could conceal movement, and which trails an advancing force would have to use. The Americans, by contrast, were moving through unfamiliar country with little intelligence and no accurate maps. The Paiwan also wore face paint to conceal themselves among the vegetation.
The expedition soon became a frustrating and exhausting ordeal. The Americans possessed superior firepower, but this advantage meant little against opponents who refused to present clear targets. Towards the end of the day, Lieutenant Commander Alexander Slidell MacKenzie, one of the expedition's leaders, was struck by a musket ball and was killed. This was the campaign’s only casualty.
A Paiwan village. Credit: Wikimedia Commons
Instead of pursing the attackers, which was futile anyway, the men abandoned their campaign and returned to the ship. By then, the soldiers were marching through the jungles for six hours and were suffering from heat exhaustion and dehydration.
The Formosa Expedition ended without achieving any of its objectives. The Americans had failed to locate or punish those responsible for the Rover killings. They had suffered casualties, including the death of a senior officer. Paiwan casualties were unknown, probably none, as no bodies were found.
After the failed punitive expedition, Rear Admiral Bell recommended that the only way to ensure the area was safe was to enlist a powerful local ally to drive out the Paiwan natives. The American consul, Charles W. Le Gendre persuaded the Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang to send his own expedition to Taiwan. When this was denied, Le Gendre travelled to southern Taiwan and opened discussions with Paiwan leaders. He eventually reached an agreement under which local chiefs pledged protection for future shipwreck survivors who might come ashore in their territory. Le Gendre later reported that the power demonstrated by the U.S. expedition in June subdued the Paiwan chief into negotiation, although this claim is very debatable.
Despite the agreement, Formosan natives continued to kill shipwreck survivors. In 1871, a group of sailors from the Ryukyu Kingdom were shipwrecked in southern Taiwan, and dozens were killed by Paiwan warriors. When Japan demanded action, Qing officials again struggled to assert authority over the indigenous territories.
In 1874, the Japanese launched their own military intervention in southern Taiwan. It became Japan's first major overseas military operation and is often viewed as an early step in the country's imperial expansion. Unlike the American expedition, the Japanese campaign succeeded in invading the village and killing more than eighty tribesmen but at a cost: they lost more than five hundred men from diseases.
There are some interesting similarities between the Formosa Expedition and the Vietnam War. In both conflicts, the Americans possessed superior weapons and naval power. But the local defenders had a deep understanding of the terrain and used it to neutralize many of those advantages. The Paiwan strategy of ambush, withdrawal, and re-ambush bears a resemblance to later guerrilla tactics used by the Viet Cong.
It is important, however, not to push the comparison too far. The 1867 campaign lasted only a single day, involved fewer than 200 Americans, and was essentially a punitive raid rather than a prolonged war.
References:
# Formosa Expedition. Wikipedia
# The Formosa Expedition, 1867. Naval History and Heritage Command
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